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U.S. financial markets began to stabilize in the Spring of 2009. Fiscal stimulus, capital 
injections to banks through the Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP), near zero short term 
interest rates, and quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve have all combined to rally the equity 
and corporate bond markets and restore positive GDP growth.  Even as this process was ongoing, 
a series of papers in macroeconomics and asset pricing have begun to explore the causes of the 
crisis and provide a road map to a more stable financial system. 
Hyun Shin of Princeton has joined with  a series of co-authors, Adrian and Shin (2008, 
2010) and Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010), to explore the role of leverage and risk-based capital 
requirements. A key message has been the pro-cyclicality of leverage and value-at-risk (VaR ) 
measures that might encourage excessive risk taking. 
The paper in this volume by Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand belongs to a second set of 
papers that explore the asset pricing implications of changing risk appetite. This paper looks at 
assets more broadly and builds upon earlier papers by these authors, Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand 
(2004) and Danielsson and Zigrand (2008). Related work on other assets includes Adrian, Etula 
and Shin (2009) who focus on exchange rates. 
 
2  The Model 
The implicit microfoundation for the VaR  criteria is from Adrian and Shin (2008). They 
show that firms with exponential loss functions will use VaR  to evaluate their risk exposure. 
More formally, for every optimal contract, the intermediary maintains just enough capital to keep 
VaR  where the probability of default is a constant.
1 
                                                 
1 While not modelled, one could also motivate the paper with a regulatory regime like Basel II where In a companion paper DSZ (2011), the authors model risk neutral traders who choose a 
dollar investment  t D  in the risky equities  t V , with endogenous expected mean and standard 
deviation, ( , ),  tt u  subject to a value at risk constraint, 
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is proportional to the generalized Sharpe ratio. This makes the risk neutral traders act as if they 
were risk averse with a coefficient of relative risk aversion 
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In this paper, DSZ study asset demand functions 
 








The authors obtain, in the single asset case, a closed form rational expectations equilibrium
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Volatility and drift can be expressed as a function of the state variable  t V  which the author’s 
graph in their Figure 3 for the parameterization  = 0.01, r   =5 ,   = 0.4,  z   =10, c  where  =1   
                                                                                                                                                             
capital requirements are risk-based. 
2 The equilibrium is unique up to a constant of integration  . c  and  =0 . 5   are scaling parameters for the demand functions. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
  
2.1  Asset pricing implications 
The key result is that volatility is non-monotonic, with a range in which volatility is 
increasing in the risky asset holdings. At this intermediate value, there is a positive feedback effect 
in which rising stock prices lead the trader to hold even more equity. In the multivariate case, they 
show that return correlation can also rise over the same range. The attractive feature of this model 
is the endogenous rise in volatility and asset correlations. 
My first comment concerns the need to calibrate the model to the magnitude of the crisis.  
Is the change from the low volatility to high volatility regime large enough to explain the events of 
2007-9? 
 
2.2  Policy implications 
Aggregating from a representative firm, the model has important policy implications. 
Indeed, these market wide implications are an appealing part of the model. I focus on the case 
where the economy is on the downward sloping portion of Figure 1.  If all firms add to their risky 
asset positions following a positive shock, volatility in this region is actually falling. This loosens 
the VaR constraint, and leads banks to take on even more leverage. This mechanism for 
pro-cyclical leverage has been cited by the Committee on the Global Financial System (CFGS, 
2009) of the Bank for International Settlements as an important source of instability. 
In the model’s version of a crisis, the firm starts to climb back up the hill in Figure 1 as  t V  
falls. A negative shock leads to rising volatility and can set off a sequence of deleveraging.  By most accounts this process is still ongoing.  
As I continue with my discussion, I now turn to whether there is evidence in the data for 
this very appealing model. 
 
3  Evidence from the U.S. Financial Sector 
I begin with a broad view of the U.S. financial sector looking at both commercial and 
investment banks. I then develop a case study comparison of two investment banks, Bear Stearns 
and Goldman Sachs, the first to collapse and the institution that has emerged as perhaps the 
strongest. 
 
3.1  Leverage in Commercial and Investment Banks 
I graph in Figure 2 the leverage ratios, measured as the ratio of assets to shareholder equity, 
for U.S. investment banks and brokerage firms and commercial banks from 1985-2008. If there is 
any trend in leverage leading into the crisis, it is negative. Indeed, leverage was higher in the 1980s 
than the 2000s. 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 Adrian and Shin (2008) have emphasized that risk may have become more concentrated at 
the large institutions. If I limit the analysis to the five largest firms in each category, there is an 
upward trend in leverage among the investment banks after 2004.
3 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 I do not have any comprehensive data on value-at-risk, but the CFGS notes that VaR was 
stable or declining into mid-2006 for the largest banks in the U.S., Europe and Japan. 
                                                 
3  On April 28, 2004, the SEC made amendments to Rule 15c3-1, which established net capital requirements 
for investment banks. The five largest institutions were allowed to become Consolidated Supervisory 
Entities which allowed them to use VaR  models for setting capital requirements. The remainder of this section is a case study of Bear and Goldman. I discuss the 
commercial banks in a related paper, Mizrach (2011b). 
 
3.2  Bear Stearns v. Goldman Sachs 
Between 1999 and 2004, leverage, graphed in Figure 4, was higher at Bear than Goldman, 
but Goldman closed the gap after 2004. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Bear’s leverage was falling and dropped below 30 in 2006, the year before their implosion. 
There is no trend in value-at-risk, graphed in Figure 5 for the two firms, until the crisis is 
well underway.  Goldman has a slightly higher VaR. 
Insert Figure 5 here 
 These data are consistent with the model.  It seems that the VaR  constraint was never 
binding until Bear Stearns began to shed assets in the summer of 2007.  It seems as though I need 
to go beyond  VaR  and leverage to understand why Bear Stearns failed. 
 
4  (Off) Balance Sheets 
I will emphasize three things in my discussion: (1) The role of special purpose entities; (2) 
Level 3 asset valuation; (3) Interruptions in funding liquidity. All three require a careful 
consideration of balance sheets and regulatory filings. 
 
4.1  Special purpose entities 
The vulnerability of a securities firm to a panic depends upon the structure of their assets 
and liabilities. The firms that failed including Bear had relatively large off-balance sheet exposures. Many of these were organized in the form of special purpose entities.  There is an 
academic literature on the purpose of the SPEs, but the impact was nonetheless to make the firm’s 
balance sheet more opaque. 
The accounting treatment of securitizations was governed by the Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB) Statement 140 originally issued in September 2000. The standard defined 
a Qualifying Special Purpose Entity (QSPE). To determine whether the exposures went 
off-balance sheet, the asset structure had to be a “true sale” that limited the recourse with respect to 
the parent. Financial Interpretation No. (FIN) 46, revised substantially in December 2003, defines 
a related structure called a Variable Interest Entity (VIE). 
Insert Figure 6 here 
 Figure 6 shows that Bear Stearns relied on these structures to a much larger extent than 
Goldman.
4 Their exposures nearly triple between February 2005 and May 2007, rising from 
3.46% to 11.32% of assets.  Goldman never allowed their exposure to exceed 2%. Perhaps more 
importantly, they began to reduce their exposure in February 2006. 
 
4.2  Illiquid assets 
The most overused word in the crisis has been liquidity. It has many meanings. In the 
context of asset valuation, it refers to the ability to produce accurate, real time fair market values 
for a bank’s positions. A related point captured by the DSZ model are the potential losses from 
having to make a fire-sale of these illiquid positions. 
In September 2006, the FASB issued Statement 157 on Fair Value Measurements. The 
standard considers a hierarchy of transparency ranging from Level 1 assets which have publicly 
                                                 
4 As Mizrach (2011b) notes, off-balance sheet activity was even more substantial at the large commercial 
banks where Tier 1 capital was closely monitored. quoted prices, and Level 3 assets which may often be priced using internal models. 
Bear Stearns first reported its’ Level 3 assets in the first quarter of 2007 SEC filings. Their 
exposure was similar to Goldman Sachs with both firms at around 5% of total assets. I compare 
these levels in quarterly snapshots in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 here 
As the crisis unfolded, it appears that Goldman was able to reduce or limit their exposure 
though while Bear Stearn’s kept rising right up until their collapse.  In determining the fate of the 
two companies, it appears that the type of Level 3 assets held matters more than the level. In the 
case of Bear Stearns, there has been more (eventual) disclosure; a portion of their illiquid assets 
wound up in a special purpose entity created the Federal Reserve Bank of New York called 
Maiden Lane I.      Using the Maiden Lane financial statement,
5  I estimate that 56% of the portfolio 
was in commercial (48%) and residential (8%) mortgage backed securities. Maiden Lane had an 
unrealized capital loss of more than 4$ billion on the Level 3 portfolio in the eight months after its 
acquisition. 
The type of assets also mattered a great deal once their counterparties began to demand 
more collateral. 
 
5  Bear’s Collapse 
Bear Stearns operated two hedge funds with leveraged exposure to the subprime mortgage 
market,
6 largely through collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  High Grade Structured Credit 
Strategies Fund (SCSF) had $925 million in capital employed at 6 times leverage. It was three 
years old and had 40 straight months without a loss, producing a cumulative 50% return.  High 
                                                 
5 http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/annual/annual08/MaidenLanefinstmt2009.pdf 
6 Despite claiming only 6% exposure to subprime, the funds’ exposures were actually closer to 60%. Grade Structured Credit Enhanced Leverage Fund (SELF) was started in August 2006. It invested 
$638 million in investor capital at 10 times leverage. 
SCSF reported its first ever loss in March 2007. In late April, Goldman, as a counterparty 
to some of the trades, marked down subprime assets to $0.55. When Bear questioned the marks, 
which ranged between $0.80 to $0.98 from other parties, Goldman offered to sell their own 
subprime assets to Bear at their mark. Bear did not bite. 
Bear posted a –19% decline in SCSF for April. Redemptions followed, Merrill Lynch 
pulled collateral in June, and both funds collapsed at the end of July 2007. Bear took the remaining 
assets in both funds and put them on their own balance sheet. 
As subprime assets continued to deteriorate,
7 Bear’s SPEs are marked down.  In their 
final quarterly financial statement, February 29, 2008, the value of the special purpose entities falls 
by –32.5% to $26.74 billion. 
 
6  Turn Off the Lights: Funding Liquidity 
Gorton and Metrick (2009) have emphasized that in the final stages of the investment 
bank’s collapse, there was a modern version of a bank panic which they call the “run on the repo.” 
Repo refers to the lending of securities as a source of day-to-day funding liquidity, a mechanism 
that has also been emphasized by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). As Bear’s positions soured, 
they prudently began to raise cash which rises from 3.8% to 8.9% of the balance sheet, shown in 
Table 2, between February 2007 and February 2008. 
Insert Table 2 here 
They sold off and/or wrote down financial instruments and the structured entities on the 
balance sheet.  They were squeezed (perhaps rationally) by their counterparties though: securities 
                                                 
7 MarkIt's ABX index of subprime CDS is a reasonable proxy, see e.g. Gorton (2008) or Mizrach (2011a). pledged as collateral rise to 5.7% of assets, and it also appears that firms were slow to pledge 
collateral in return, as this falls to less than 4% of assets. 
The $18 billion in cash that Bear Stearns possessed
8 on Monday March 17, 2008, only 
managed to last until the weekend’s emergency merger with JP Morgan Chase. 
 
7  Conclusion 
Leverage can be problematic measure, but it seems as though leverage was not excessive 
compared to prior non-crisis episodes. VaR  was held relatively constant, and the level does not 
have much predictive value in the crisis. 
Back in the superficially calm days of January 2007 with the CBOE volatility index below 
10, the markets may have been in the right hand side of DSZ’s Figure 1. As firms like Bear sold 
assets, volatility rose and asset prices fell, leading to additional selling. What the model and many 
economists are still struggling to explain, is this: why was the hill was so steep given the relatively 
small size of the subprime sector? 
My discussion tries to sketch out a more comprehensive theory. The components of this 
model would have to incorporate: (1) Balance sheet transparency (SPE, VIEs etc.); (2) The 
complexity of assets in the portfolio (Level 3 assets like synthetic CDOs); (3) How crowded are 
the trades? Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2009) concept of a distressed bank’s value-at-risk called 
CoVar may prove useful here; (4) seizures in funding liquidity. 




                                                 
8 Kelly (2009) reports that the cash cushion was cut in half in just three days.  Bear Stearns needed a short 
term loan from the Federal Reserve, via JP Morgan, on Friday March 21, 2008 just to make it to the 
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Table 1: Bear Stearns v. Goldman Sachs Level 3 Assets   
   
   Bear  Goldman 
Date   $bn  % of assets  $bn  % of assets 
01-Feb-07   19.0  4.81%  47.6  5.22% 
01-May-07   18.0  4.26%  54.1  5.74% 
03-Aug-07   20.3  5.10%  72.0  6.89% 
01-Nov-07   23.9  6.05%  54.7  4.89% 
28-Feb-08   37.4  9.36%  82.3  6.92% 
 
The data are from the SEC 10-Q and 10-K filings of both banks for each year. 
  
   Table 2: Bear Stearns Consolidated Assets  
   
Assets $mn   28-Feb-07     31-May-07     31-Aug-07      30-Nov-07     29-Feb-08    
Cash   5,891 1.5% 11,178 2.6%  18,143   4.6%  21,406  5.4%  20,786  5.2% 
Cash segregated   9,126 2.3% 4,653 1.1%  13,460   3.4%  12,890  3.3%  14,910  3.7% 
Securities rcvd. as collateral   21,227 5.4% 18,948 4.5%  18,301   4.6%  15,599  4.0%  15,371  3.9% 
Securities to resell   37,248 9.4% 42,272 10.0%  32,144   8.1%  27,878  7.1%  26,888  6.7% 
Securities borrowed   84,015 21.3% 92,050 21.8%  80,039   20.2%  82,245  20.8%  87,143  21.8% 
Receivables   40,730 10.3% 46,984 11.1%  43,320   10.9%  53,522  13.5%  53,332  13.4% 
Financial instruments   134,410 34.1% 136,411 32.2%  126,870   32.0%  122,518  31.0%  118,201  29.6% 
Pledged as collateral   12,754 3.2% 12,265 2.9%  15,004   3.8%  15,724  4.0%  22,903  5.7% 
Assets of VIEs and QSPEs   41,483 10.5% 49,985 11.8%  41,045   10.3%  33,553  8.5%  29,991  7.5% 
Property and equipment   508 0.1% 547 0.1%  586   0.2%  605  0.2%  608  0.2% 
Other   7,119 1.8% 8,011 1.9%  8,180   2.1%  9,422  2.4%  8,862  2.2% 
Total   394,512    423,304    397,091      395,362     398,995    
 
  
The data are from the SEC 10-Q and 10-K filings. 
 Figure 1: Mean, Volatility, and Risk Aversion in Equilibrium
The figure, from Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand, graphs the model’s equilibrium mean, volatility,
and risk aversion for the parameters r = 0.01, ￿ = 0.5, ￿ = 5, ￿z = 0.4, ￿ = 1, and c = 10.Figure 2: Leverage in the Banking Sector
The data are from Compustat. Leverage is computed as the ratio of assets to shareholder equity,
(ATQ/SEQQ). The first group is SIC code 6211 which includes investment banks, broker dealers
and flotation companies. The second group is SIC code 6020 which includes commercial banks
but not savings institutions. I limit both groups to a minimum of $5 billion in assets and $1
billion in shareholder equity.Figure 3: Leverage at the Largest Institutions
The data are from Compustat.  Leverage is computed as the ratio of assets to shareholder equity,
(ATQ/SEQQ). The five investment banks are Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. The five commercial banks are Bank of America, Citigroup,
JP Morgan Chase, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo.Figure 4: Leverage at Bear Stearns v. Goldman Sachs
The data are from Compustat.  Leverage is computed as the ratio of assets to shareholder equity,
(ATQ/SEQQ). I restrict the period here to 1999–2008, a time span in which both firms were
publicly traded.Figure 5: Daily Value-at-Risk at Bear Stearns v. Goldman Sachs
The data are from the first quarter SEC 10-Q filings of both banks for each year. The value-at-
risk is a 1-day 95% loss coverage calculation expressed in dollars which I have converted into a
percentage by dividing by total assets.Figure 6: Special Purpose and Variable Interest Entities as a Percentage of Total Assets
The data are from SEC 10-Q and 10-K filings of both banks for each year. I report the
consolidated assets of the Qualified Special Purpose Entities (QSPEs) and Variable Interest
Entities (VIEs) of both firms as a percentage of total assets.